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Robert Brischetto 
University of Texas, San Antonio 
We examine minority representation resulting from modified at-large elections (cumulative and lim- 
ited voting) used in U.S. localities in the 1990s. Hypotheses about the relative proportionality of 
descriptive representation under various local election systems are presented and tested. We find that 
CV/LV elections produced descriptive representation of African-Americans at levels similar to those 
in larger single-member district places, and at levels that exceed those from some small, southern 
SMD places. Results for Latino representation are more qualified. Our results offer encouragement 
for those interested in facilitating minority representation without using the acrimonious process of 
drawing districts on the basis of races. 
ecent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have directed increased 
attention at alternatives to districting for the purpose of minority representation 
(see Pildes and Donoghue 1995). In this paper we assess how modified at-large 
plans (limited and cumulative voting) might facilitate minority representation. 
We also examine how representation under these plans compares to that obtained 
with district and at-large elections. 
In previous decades, court interpretations of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) 
broadened the ability of the U.S. Department of Justice and minority plaintiffs to 
challenge local election plans that might dilute minority vote strength (i.e., 
Thornburg v. Gingles 1986; Gomez v. Watsonville 1988). The plans most often 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Politi- 
cal Science Association. Partial funding for the research was provided by the WWU Bureau for 
Faculty Research and by UC Riverside. Direct correspondence and requests for data used in this pa- 
per to Todd Donovan, Department of Political Science, WWU, Bellingham, WA 98225 (or 
donovan@nessie.cc.wwu.edu). 
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Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting 1109 
subject to challenge include councils elected under multimember, at-large sys- 
tems. The standard remedy in these situations has been changing to single-member 
district (SMD) plans, with districts drawn to facilitate minority representation. 
Indeed, a substantial body of evidence demonstrates that racial and ethnic mi- 
norities are more likely to win seats proportionate to their share of the population 
in districted jurisdictions (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Polinard, Wrinkle, and 
Longoria 1991; Welch 1990). 
Limits to Districting as a Remedy 
Districting on the basis of race, however, has come under increased scrutiny 
by the courts. The Shaw v. Reno decision (1993) criticized "bizarre"-shaped is- 
tricts. Miller v. Johnson (1995) found a majority-minority congressional district 
unconstitutional and argued that districts should not be drawn based "on race in 
substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices." Shaw v. 
Hunt (1996) and Bush v. Vera (1996) found separate districting plans in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. When race is found to 
be the "predominant factor" in districting, the contemporary Court must apply 
the strict scrutiny test for the equal protection clause. This makes it extremely 
difficult for state and local governments to establish a compelling interest in 
adopting such districts. 
Majority-minority districts have also come under criticism since they may 
"waste" votes (Lijphart 1994; Still 1984). Others suggest that districting can 
limit minority influence over policy (Guinier 1991, 1994; Sass and Mehay 1996) 
and prevent the formation of coalitions across racial lines (Swain 1993). There 
are practical problems as well. Edward Still (1991) notes that districts drawn 
with a 65% African-American population are perhaps the bare minimum re- 
quired to facilitate African-American representation in some instances, although 
Brace et al. (1988) note that this minimum varies greatly by place. 
Cumulative and Limited Voting in the United States 
In response to the perceived limits of districting, cumulative voting (CV) and 
limited voting (LV) have been proposed as a means of increasing minority rep- 
resentation. A number of small- and medium-sized U.S. jurisdictions have 
adopted these plans (Amy 1993; Cole and Taebel 1992; Cole, Taebel, and 
Engstrom 1990; Still 1984, 1991).l Both systems operate to elect multimember 
councils at-large and facilitate proportionality by changing how voters cast 
ballots. 
Several jurisdictions in North Carolina, Alabama, and Texas adopted modified 
at-large systems (and to a lesser extent, places in New Mexico, South Dakota, 
I There is only one jurisdiction in the United States with a population over 100,000 using a CV or 
LV system: Peoria, Illinois. 
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and Illinois). Over 75 city councils, county councils, and school boards had 
adopted CV or LV at the time of this writing.2 These elections create relatively 
low thresholds of exclusion the proportion of votes that a group needs to elect 
one candidate assuming all the group's voters support the candidate. In a CV 
election for a five-member council, for example, a minority candidate with 17% 
support could not be denied a seat.3 
Under LV, voters are restricted to fewer votes than seats up for election. Can- 
didates are elected by plurality, and candidates with the most votes win until 
seats are filled. In party systems, outcomes under LV are expected to be more 
proportionate the more limited the vote is relative to the number of seats at stake 
(for a description see Lakeman 1970, 80-88; Still 1984, 253-55).4 Cumulative 
voting modifies at-large plans by allowing voters to cast as many votes as seats 
being elected, with the additional option of clustering votes among any combi- 
nation of candidates. The voter may typically distribute votes in any way she 
feels, including distributing them across fewer candidates than available seats. 
Candidates are elected by plurality, and candidates with the most votes win un- 
til seats are filled. 
Variation in CV and LV plans in the United States is characterized by manip- 
ulation of two main factors: the rules regarding vote allocations, and the number 
of seats elected via CV or LV Election rules determine the number of seats 
elected under CV or LV directly by reducing or enlarging the number of posi- 
tions in a given jurisdiction, or indirectly through staggering the elections of 
those positions across time. Most applications of CV allow voters to distribute 
their votes as they choose, but at least one (Peoria, IL) constrains how votes are 
cast by providing only one space next to each candidate (then dividing five votes 
across the candidates marked). 
Table 1 illustrates some important points about variation across modified at- 
large election plans in U.S. places having 1,000 or more population. Clearly, 
there is no single CV or LV plan. Most places using CV elect their entire coun- 
cil at-large with CV-although a small number of places mix CV with 
single-member districts (an example being Alamagordo, NM). Across all CV 
places, the average number of seats elected is only slightly lower than the aver- 
age number of total seats (6.29 vs. 6.41). Table 1 shows that these elections tend 
to occur in places having significant minority populations. 
2 Details about each jurisdiction's systems were identified with phone calls to local officials in each 
place. Communications with local officials and individuals involved with VRA litigation led to the 
identification of these communities. Several additional places are in the process of settling lawsuits 
that will result in the adoption of limited or cumulative voting. 
3The threshold of exclusion for CV is equal to 1/ (1 + [number of seats]). 
4Lijphart (1994, 40) points out an extreme (hypothetical) case where three seats are contested and 
voters cast one vote. One candidate could win all but two votes while the second and third candidates 
receive one vote each. All would be elected if there is no legally defined minimum for election. The 
threshold of exclusion for LV is V(V + n) where V # votes and n # of seats (Engstrom 1993, 
Still 1984). 
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TABLE 1 
Cumulative and Limited Voting Arrangements in U.S. Communities 
Cumulative Voting (CV). 
Average number of total council seats per place 6.41 
Average number elected at-large with CV per place 6.29 
Average number elected CV per election 3.22 
Average number minority seats per placea 0.57 
Average percent minority voting age populationa 31 
Number of cases (elections) 79 
Limited Voting (LV): 
Average number of total council seats per place 7.06 
Average number elected at-large with LV per place 4.94 
Average number elected LV per election 4.00 
Average number minority seats per placea 1.06 
Modal vote limit: 1 
Average percent minority voting age population' 0 
Number of cases (elections) 17 
Note. Cases used for averages are based on individual elections. 
aFigures for the largest minority group only. 
Table 1 also demonstrates that many CV places do not elect all seats in a single 
election. In places outside of Texas, the entire board or council (typically five to 
seven members) is typically elected in a single election with CV Yet in Texas, 
although the entire council is often elected by CV, elections are staggered over 
time such that only two or three seats are up in a single contest. This causes the av- 
erage number of seats elected via CV per place, per election cycle (3.22) to be 
substantially less than the average number of seats elected via CV per place (6.29). 
In about one-third of places using LV, some seats are elected from single- 
member districts with the remaining elected from multimember districts at-large. 
Conversely, about two-thirds of the places using LV elect all council seats from 
at-large, multimember districts. Few of these places elect all seats in the same 
election (most stagger elections). For this reason, many places limit voters to a 
single vote, typically cast in an election with three or four seats up (avg. = 4.00). 
LV plans include further variation. At least one county utilizes place require- 
ments (a candidate must reside in a specific multimember district elected via LV) 
and uses more than one multimember district. A small number of places allow 
voters to cast two to four votes, depending on how many seats are elected. 
Strategic Burdens under Limited and Cumulative Voting 
There are reasons to expect some deviations from proportionate descriptive 
representation in CV and LV places. CV and LV are often labeled as "semi- 
proportionate" in classifications of electoral systems (Amy 1993; Lakeman 
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1970). Much of the potential for these modified at-large plans to produce 
deviations from proportionality lie in the demands for strategic coordination 
(Cox 1997) that each system places at the mass and elite level. Under each sys- 
tem, a party or slating group must effectively maximize seats by controlling the 
candidate selection process such that they place an optimal number of candi- 
dates on the ballot. To optimize representation, the groups must also spread 
their supporters' votes accurately across those candidates they nominate (Still 
1984, 254-55). Skill at this has been cited as an explanation for the seat 
bonuses5 received by Japan's LDP under a form of limited voting (Cox and 
Niou 1994). If a group overnominates and lists too many candidates, it risks 
spreading the votes of supporters too thin, causing underrepresentation. If a 
group undernominates, it errs by possibly wasting votes that might have yielded 
another seat. 
These strategic burdens can apply to both larger parties/groups and smaller 
parties/groups (Goldburg 1994; Silva 1964). However, Lijphart (1994) and oth- 
ers suggest that LV systems might be legitimately considered as PR since the 
strategic burdens are often likely to be greater for majorities than minorities. A 
minority group often need only nominate one candidate to insure some repre- 
sentation (or simply nominate as many candidates as votes allowed). Majority 
groups, in contrast, can have a greater risk of nomination errors (Lijphart 1994, 
42; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; see also Cox 1991). Christensen and Johnson 
(1995) find Japan's SNTV system to be proportionate when compared to other 
PR systems if district magnitude (seats per district) is accounted for. 
Control of nominations under CV might also be required for proportionate de- 
scriptive representation of minority groups, but CV further modifies at-large 
plans in a manner that can produce an additional strategic burden for groups. 
With CV, groups must coordinate their supporters' voting behavior to discourage 
voters from spreading their multiple votes in a manner that disperses electoral 
strength. In other words, voters must be informed about the optimal strategy of 
clustering votes among candidates. Plainly, CV can require strategic coordina- 
tion at both the mass (vote distribution) and elite (nomination) levels, while LV 
might require less coordination if the vote is limited to one. As a result, Still 
(1984, 256) suggests that CV is likely to require more strategic voting than LV 
to achieve proportional results (on the possibility of strategic mistakes by mi- 
nority voters in CV, see also Engstrom 1993). 
Since CV allows voters more options when delivering their votes, the exis- 
tence of such opportunities increases the probability that some minority voters 
will spread votes across multiple candidates, even if only one minority candidate 
is running. This, in turn, increases the chance that minority votes might go to 
nonminority candidates, potentially limiting the translation of minority vote 
The seat bonus is the proportion of seats a group receives in excess of its share of the vote. 
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strength into seats.6 Furthermore, in CV or LV places where a group's population 
share is near the threshold of exclusion and voting is racially polarized, minority 
candidates can only be elected if their supporters turn out at a rate matching 
majority-group voters. All of this suggests that descriptive representation of 
minorities under CV might be somewhat less proportionate to population than 
that obtained under LV. 
There are reasons to expect that each plan could produce less proportionate 
descriptive representation than SMD systems. With SMD plans, if cartographers 
have the ability to tailor boundaries to create heavily minority districts, and they 
create a number of minority districts in proportion to overall minority vote share 
in a jurisdiction, then proportionate descriptive representation can be expected. 
Compared to CV/LV, once homogeneous majority-minority districts are created, 
limited strategic behavior is required of elites (e.g., mobilization of minority 
voters in numbers approaching majority-group turnout and controlling nomina- 
tions), and little strategic electoral behavior is required of voters (e.g., vote 
dispersion) to produce proportionate descriptive representation.7 In other words, 
districting can institutionalize some of the strategic actions needed to facilitate 
minority representation, and could possibly produce greater minority representa- 
tion than CV/LV systems. 
Hypotheses: Outcomes Under Modified At-Large Voting 
The discussion above suggests several testable propositions about how the 
seats-population relationship in modified at-large elections compares to those 
obtained under districting, to unmodified at-large (AL) plans, and how LV and 
CV results compare to each other. 
First, we expect that modified at-large systems should produce more propor- 
tionate representation of minorities than that resulting from the traditional 
at-large method. Assuming that a group votes roughly as a block, any group win- 
ning a plurality is likely to sweep all seats in an unmodified at-large election 
(Lakeman 1970). Although nearly every electoral system has bias in favor of the 
group gaining the largest vote share in an election, the bias is greatest under 
American-style at-large, plurality systems (Johnson 1979). Conversely, both LV 
and CV have lower minimum thresholds than at-large elections. Cox (1991) il- 
lustrates that outcomes under forms of limited voting in party systems can even 
be equivalent to d'Hondt PR under certain obtainable conditions. 
6Surveys from a city using CV illustrated that 36% of Latino voters used the option to cast at least 
one of their votes for a non-Latino candidate (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1990; Cole and Taebel 
1992). 
7Optimal districting arrangements are a possibility where minority groups are highly segregated 
spatially. Since African-American housing is historically more segregated from whites than Latino 
housing (Massey and Denton 1987), districting might produce more-proportionate representation of 
African-Americans than of Latinos (Taebel 1978; see also Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). 
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Second, given strategic demands and the "semiproportionate" nature of 
CV/LV, we expect that modified at-large local elections might produce less- 
proportionate descriptive representation of minorities than SMD elections.8 
Modified at-large plans can facilitate minority representation by lowering the 
threshold of votes required for a minority candidate to win office, but groups 
must be fairly well organized politically to take advantage of these systems. 
SMD plans might facilitate minority representation with less coordination re- 
quirements for elites and voters. 
Third, limited voting might be expected to produce more-proportionate out- 
comes than cumulative voting. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
the latter system can require an additional element of strategic behavior (coordi- 
nation of vote dispersion) from voters and elites. 
Data and Framework for Analysis 
Cases for our tests are drawn from U.S. cities, counties, and school districts that 
adopted CV or LV in response to actual or anticipated VRA lawsuits. Since we are 
interested in estimating how electoral systems are related to representation of mi- 
nority groups relative to their share of the local population, we limited our 
analysis to jurisdictions for which 1990 census population data are available. Ini- 
tial information on local election systems and election results were obtained in the 
spring of 1995 via telephone interviews with city clerks and county election offi- 
cials, with additional data acquired in subsequent interviews in 1996 and 1997. 
Nearly all the places we identified are located in three states: Texas, Alabama, and 
North Carolina. South Dakota, New Mexico, and Illinois each also have a single 
jurisdiction that used CV We limit our analysis to places from these six states 
where the predominant minority made up less than 50% of the voting population. 
We treat individual elections as cases. This allows us greater comparability in 
our analysis, largely because this diffuses the problem created by those jurisdic- 
tions that stagger.elections. We include the two most recent elections from each 
jurisdiction in the analysis, or the most recent if the jurisdiction had only one CV 
or LV contest as of spring 1997. This allows us to capture variation in elections 
across places and within places, since most of these communities alternate the 
number of seats contested in consecutive elections. Data from nearly all these 
places involve elections contested between 1994 and 1997, although the second 
most recent elections in three places were held between 1990 and 1992. 
The dependent variable is the percentage CV or LV seats won by minority 
candidates in each election. Our models thus isolate the seats-population rela- 
8 This logic does not suggest that any (national) electoral system using winner-take-all, single- 
member districts would ever produce more proportionate outcomes than a multimember LV/SNTV 
or CV system. It is important to note that the difference in proportionality we expect is not so much 
a function of single-member districts per se, but of the apportionment of racial and ethnic groups into 
particular districts. 
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tionship unique to modified at-large elections, and eliminate from the analysis 
those seats elected in these communities by other methods.9 Communities 
included in the seats-population analysis were limited to places with a popula- 
tion of more than 1,000, the minimum for racial information to be included in 
census data. Most communities are rather small, with a median population of 
3,167 and a mean of 10,311. The resulting sample used to assess the seats- 
population relationship includes a total of 62 jurisdictions offering data for 
96 elections. 
Table 2 demonstrates that minorities have had success contesting these elec- 
tions, despite low levels of representation prior to the change in election systems. 
A Latino candidate was elected in 70% of the contests where a Latino candidate 
sought office under CV Further, in 96% of CV/LV elections where an African- 
American sought office, at least one African-American was elected. Table 2 also 
illustrates something that will be discussed below: in elections where the pre- 
dominant minority was Latino, Latino candidates were on the ballot in only 71% 
of elections. 
Hypotheses about how elections translate minority voting age population 
share into minority seats on local councils can be tested by regressing seats 
against population (Engstrom and McDonald 1981). Bivariate regression pro- 
duces slope estimates that can be used to assess differences in seats-population 
relationships across electoral systems, and can be compared to those produced 
by other studies using the same method. For example, when percentage data are 
used, a slope of 1.0 with an intercept of 0 indicates that minority seat shares on 
TABLE 2 
Racial/Ethnic Distribution of Cases 
Predominant Total Elections with Elections with 
Minority Number of Minority Minority 
Group Elections Candidates Victory 
Latino 66 47 (71%)a 33 (50%)' 
(70%)b 
African-American 28 26 (93%)' 25 (89%)' 
(96%)b 
Native American 02 01 (50%)a 00 (0%)ab 
Note: Cases are individual elections. Data are from the two most recent elections, or the most re- 
cent election if the jurisdiction had only one CV/LV contest as of 1997. 
apercent of all elections 
bpercent of elections where minority candidates sought office 
9For example, if a place was electing five seats via CV (or LV) in an election, the dependent 
variable would be calculated as # CV seats won by minority candidates/S. Likewise, if a place elected 
three seats via districts, and two via CV, the dependent variable would be # CV seats won by minor- 
ity candidates/2. 
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local councils occur in exact proportion to the percent of the local voting age 
population that is minority. 
Due to the nature of our data, our analysis is slightly different than some 
studies of minority representation. Many studies now use regression models es- 
timated with a universe of medium and large cities (i.e., all cities over 50,000). 
With such data, a single model can be specified with multiple intercepts and 
interaction terms that represent how different electoral systems affect the 
seats-population relationship. Interaction terms allow single-equation models to 
test if various electoral structures have different effects on minority council rep- 
resentation (Bullock 1994; Bullock and MacManus 1993; Engstrom and 
McDonald 1981, 347; Welch 1990, 1055). 
Our data differ from these "larger-N' studies in that our cases are election results 
from smaller places and our sample is the universe of all known places above 1,000 
population using CV or LV. Given the small number of cases, the unique charac- 
teristics of these communities, and the circumstances under which these election 
systems are adopted, we cannot include multiple intercept terms that directly com- 
pare the seats-population relationship under LV and CV to other systems. 
Models are first estimated for all CV and LV jurisdictions, including cases 
where the predominant minority group is either African-American, Latino, or 
Native Americanl0 (model 3.1). We then estimate separate models for African- 
American and Latino places to assess if modified at-large voting is associated 
with a different seats-population relationship for these groups (models 3.2 and 
3.3, respectively). We also estimate a multivariate model with all cases using an 
interaction term and dummy variable to test if minority representation is more 
common under LV than CV (models 3.4). To evaluate our other hypotheses, the 
slopes resulting from these models are compared to those produced from other 
studies. This can provide some idea of how minority representation under modi- 
fied at-large elections compares to other electoral systems used in U.S. localities. 
Information about the slope of these relationships can be more important than 
a simple demonstration that more minorities serve on these local councils after 
changing to modified at-large voting. Each of these jurisdictions adopted new 
electoral systems because they had sizable minority populations with very lim- 
ited (or in many places no) minority representation. Only two of these places 
have minority populations under 10% (the lowest being 7%).11 In many (if not 
10In a single CV jurisdiction (Sisseton, SD school district) the predominant minority group is Na- 
tive American. 
11For example, Thomas and Stewart (1988, 171) note that 44% of Alabama Black Belt counties 
examined in a 1982 federal study (U.S. Civil Rights Commission 1983, cited in Thomas and Stewart 
1988) had no black representation. Many of these counties having no black representation had ma- 
jority-black populations. A number of our towns are drawn from these counties. Each of the North 
Carolina places using LV were also in VRA targeted areas since 1964. Keech and Sistrom (1994) re- 
port that 90% of North Carolina counties and cities were unmodified at-large as of 1989. Blacks were 
heavily underrepresented in these places. In places where blacks were a minority, representational eq- 
uity scores did not exceed .20. Nearly all of our North Carolina cases come from these communities. 
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most) of the jurisdictions included in our analysis, minority representation in- 
creased under modified at-large voting. Our models illustrate the systematic 
nature of this process in a manner that facilitates comparison with studies of 
other electoral systems. 
Results 
Results from model 3.1 indicate that when all modified at-large jurisdictions 
are examined simultaneously, there is a poor fit between minority population and 
percent of seats controlled by the minority groups. Variation in seats-population 
relationships across modified at-large places is evident when we examine 
African-American and Latino jurisdictions separately. The fit of the model is 
greatly improved (R2 = .26) when African-American jurisdictions are examined 
in isolation (RJ2 increases to .45 when the analysis is restricted to cases with black 
candidates). Model 3.2 illustrates that for these places, the relationship between 
seats and minority voting age population is represented by a slope of .95 and an 
intercept not significantly different than zero. Thus, in those elections where the 
primary minority is African-American, as the minority percentage of the popu- 
lation increases, a nearly equivalent gain in descriptive representation is 
achieved. Furthermore, since the intercept is near zero, population share is trans- 
lated into representation at low levels of minority population. 
Model 3.3 reports the slope of the seats-population relationship for places 
where the predominant minority is Latino. Given the insignificant slope and the 
TABLE 3 
Minority Seats-Population Relationship under Cumulative 
and Limited Voting 
Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Variables (All) (Black) (Latino) (LV) 
Minority %VAP .15 .95*** .03 .01 
(.18) (.31) (.21) (.18) 
LV Dummy - -.19 
(.15) 
LV*Min%VAP - - 1. 12** 
(.48) 
Intercept .15** .04 .16 .17** 
(.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) 
R 2 .01 .26 .00 .12a 
Number of cases 96 28 66 96 
Note. Dependent variable = number CV/LV council seats won by minorities divided by number 
of CV/LV seats in election. 
aR2 for model 4 is adjusted; all others unadjusted. 
**p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed t-tests) 
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very low R2, there does not appear to be a substantive linear relationship between 
minority population share and minority seat share on councils and school boards. 
This does not mean that Latino candidates were not elected in places that adopted 
modified at-large voting. As with majority-African-American jurisdictions, Latino 
candidates were elected in greater numbers after switching to modified at-large. 
As reported in Table 2, where Latino candidates sought office, they were success- 
ful in over half (33 out of 47) of these cases marking a dramatic improvement 
over previous levels of Latino representation in these communities (Brischetto 
1995; Brischetto and Engstrom 1998). Nevertheless, elections in many places 
with substantial Latino populations produced no Latino representation due to both 
a lack of candidates or defeat at the polls. Even when the analysis is restricted to 
cases where Latino candidates sought office (not reported here), there is still no 
significant effect. In the discussion section we address how seats-population mod- 
els can underestimate the potential for Latino representation. 
We hypothesized that these new modified at-large systems would produce 
more-proportionate descriptive representation of minorities than standard at- 
large plans, and less-proportionate representation than SMD plans. Our results 
are put into perspective by comparing the parameters from our models to those 
from other studies examining local election systems in the United States. If we 
compare our slope and intercept for African-American representation under 
modified at-large systems to those from previous studies of standard at-large sys- 
tems, we find some support for these hypotheses. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the seats-population relationship for African-Americans 
under recently modified at-large voting is similar to that found by Welch (1990) 
for African-Americans in larger (over 50,000 residents) southern cities using 
SMD where blacks are a minority of the population. Figure 1 compares our re- 
sults from model 3.2 to Welch's findings. Across much of the range in minority 
population, it appears modified (CV/LV) plans (represented by the dotted line) 
produce similar levels of representation as districting (the solid line), and slightly 
greater descriptive representation than standard at-large plans (the dashed line). 
Since nearly all of our cases come from elections in relatively small places 
that recently switched election systems, Welch's data might not be best suited for 
comparing seats-population relationships across systems. When we compare our 
estimates to those from a study of other southern places that had recently 
switched away from AL plans a study that includes many smaller, rural places 
more similar to communities in this study levels of African-American repre- 
sentation under modified at-large plans appear more striking. Bullock (1994) 
examined elections to county commissions in Georgia in 1991. Of the counties 
studied, 52 used SMD plans, an increase from 17 in 1981.12 Figure 2 plots 
12Like the cases in our study then, many of these places had recently moved away from AL plans 
in response to actual or potential VRA action under Section 2. As with our study, Bullock's cases 
were limited to places where African-Americans were in the minority (N = 149 counties). Given the 
recent election system changes in many of these places, and the small population and rural nature of 
many, we suggest they are a good basis for making comparisons with our study. 
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Bullock's bivariate seats-registration relationship in SMD places (the solid 
line) and the relationship we estimated in model 3.2 for African-American 
jurisdictions using CV/LV plans (the dotted line). The plot demonstrates re- 
sults contrary to one of our hypotheses modified at-large elections actually 
produced slightly more proportionate outcomes when compared to these dis- 
tricted places. 
The differences between standard at-large elections and CV/LV elections are 
substantial when we compare our estimates to those from Bullock's study of 
Georgia counties, and are consistent with the hypothesis that CV/LV plans will 
produce more-proportionate representation of minorities than traditional AL sys- 
tems. The dashed line represents the bivariate seats-registration relationship for 
the 41 Georgia counties still using unmodified AL elections in 1991. Compared 
to these cases, modified at-large systems produced substantially greater descrip- 
tive representation for African-Americans. 13 
Our last hypothesis dealt with the difference between outcomes under LV ver- 
sus CV systems. Since LV plans might involve fewer strategic burdens (e.g., vote 
dispersion coordination), we expected that LV systems could produce greater 
minority representation than CV Model 3.4 included a coefficient reflecting the 
interaction between a dummy representing LV places and minority voting age 
population. In theory, this coefficient isolates the unique seats-population 
relationship for LV. The significant coefficient for the interaction term (1.12; 
p < .05) can be seen as reflecting greater proportionate descriptive representa- 
tion of minorities when comparing LV to CV places. This is consistent with 
assumptions that lower strategic demands are required for effective use of LV. 
It is important to stress that there are relatively few cases of LV elections in 
the analysis in Table 3 (N = 17), and all are in places where the predominant mi- 
nority is African-American. 14 The interaction in model 3.4 could possibly 
capture the difference between African-American representation under LV and 
Latino and African-American representation under CV 
Another way to determine if minorities achieve higher representation under 
LV is to estimate the seats-population slope for the 28 places with African- 
American minorities. We first estimate the seats-population slope unique to 
these places using CV (model 4.1), then compare this to the slope for African- 
American places using LV (model 4.2). These results are reported in Table 4. 
Again, we find evidence suggesting a more-proportionate (or overproportionate) 
relationship between minority population and seats in LV elections (b = 1.12, 
13 Differences between our estimates from CV/LV and Bullock's estimates from AL and SMD are 
even more striking when we consider that our models use percent minority voting age population as 
the key independent variable, while Bullock uses percent minority voter registration. Given the 
gap between population and voter registration, our estimates could have been expected to be 
biased against finding proportionate relationships, which would be evident when registration data are 
used. 
14All of the variation in election plans occurred across African-American places. 
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TABLE 4 
African-American Seats-Population 
Relationship under Cumulative 
and Limited Voting 
Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
Variables (CV only) (LV Only) 
Minority %VAP .60** 1.12* 
(.25) (.61) 
Intercept .10** -.02 
(.04) (. 1 9) 
R2 .38 .19 
Number of cases I 1 17 
Note: Dependent variable = number CV/LV council seats won by minorities divided by number 
of CV/LV seats in election. 
*p < .10; **p < .05 (two-tailed t-tests) 
p .08) than in CV elections (b = .60; p < .05).15 However, the popula- 
tion-seats coefficient under LV is not significantly larger than the coefficient 
under CV The slope and intercept values for the population-seats model in Table 
4 does suggest that CV communities elect black candidates at about the same 
rate as the districted places analyzed by Bullock as black populations approach 
50%. At lower ranges of black population, the intercept from model 4.1 indicates 
that CV produces greater representation than Bullock's SMD places. 
There are many additional elements of election system variation that cannot 
be captured by these dummy variables (degree to which vote is limited, propor- 
tion of all seats elected CV or LV, years that jurisdiction has been using CV or 
LV, etc.). Given limited degrees of freedom here, we cannot include these terms 
and thus cannot conclude with certainty that LV as practiced in the United States 
produces more-proportionate representation of minorities than CV 
Finally, we should note that there are reasons to expect that the number 
of seats being contested should affect proportionality for any election system 
(Lijphart 1994). We did include this as an independent variable in preliminary 
models, but the effect was not significant. Since our goal is replicating models 
from other studies that did not include this measure, we do not include the 
term in models reported here. There is limited variance in number of seats con- 
tested among these elections, so it is difficult to evaluate the effect of this 
variable. 
15 A t-test of the difference between these slopes produces no significant difference. The power of 
the test is constrained by the small sample. When an interation term (LV*minority%VAP) is included 
with all 28 cases from Table 4, the coefficient is positive (b = .52) but not significant. 
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Discussion 
Our data provide evidence that modifying local at-large elections with limited 
or cumulative voting offers the promise of minority representation at levels very 
similar to those found under SMD. This finding should be encouraging to those 
interested in facilitating minority representation without relying upon the acri- 
monious process of drawing districts on the basis of race. Previous research has 
established that minorities do win seats under these modified plans. Our purpose 
was to identify how the seats-population relationship under CV/LV compares to 
those produced under other plans. For African-Americans, representation from 
CV/LV elections compares favorably to that obtained from SMD, and is more 
proportionate than representation under unmodified at-large. For Latinos in com- 
munities studied here, this might not be the case. 
Our results from Latino places raise questions about why CV election 
outcomes are less than proportionate. In the cases examined here, under- 
proportionality reflected by our estimates is likely related to a function of three 
main factors: (1) limited recruitment of Latino candidates, (2) a substantial gap 
between census measures of Latino voting age population (the key independent 
variable in these models) and actual rates of Latino participation in elections, 
and (3) the high threshold of exclusion built into CV plans adopted in many 
places where Latinos are the predominant minority. 
Among our cases are a number of Texas CV elections (N = 33) having sub- 
stantial Latino populations but achieving no Latino representation. In 19 of these 
cases, clerks indicated that no minority candidates filed for office. Likewise, 
there were only two cases where African-Americans comprised the predominant 
minority group and no African-American candidate sought office. Since the data 
reveal that the nomination problem is more substantial for Latino jurisdictions, 
undernomination can partially explain the lack of a linear relationship between 
seats and population share in majority-Latino jurisdictions. 
There were also 14 cases where Latino candidates were defeated in places 
with significant Latino populations. A second major factor affecting our ability 
to estimate representation of Latinos in modified at-large systems was the use of 
census measures of voting age population. In most of the Latino places included 
in this analysis, Latino turnout was far lower than white turnout.16 Percent mi- 
nority VAP data is likely to produce a lower estimated slope than would result 
had registration or turnout data been used, since these latter variables more ac- 
curately reflect minority electoral strength. The gap between census measures of 
voting age population and actual turnout rates is also likely to be smaller for 
African-Americans than for Latinos. When Latino turnout data were included in 
a model limited to the 14 Texas communities where such data are available and 
in which Latino candidates sought office in 1995, the slope for the Latino 
16In two of these jurisdictions, minority turnout actually exceeded Anglo turnout and minority 
candidates were elected. Turnout data are reported in Brischetto and Engstrom 1998. 
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seats-turnout relationship is 1.22 (RI2 = .30), and the result was statistically sig- 
nificant.17 This demonstrates that Latino candidates can do well under CV when 
Latino voters are mobilized. 
Compounding the population-turnout gap is a third factor. Most places in 
Texas tended to have only two or three CV seats up in any single election. All 
but two of the Latino cases in the analysis came from Texas. This means that the 
threshold of exclusion is typically either 25% or 33% in Texas. Low minority 
turnout will be particularly problematic when this threshold is this high. 
We should stress that none of these factors explaining lower rates of Latino 
representation are an automatic result of the use of modified at-large electoral 
system. Rather, the constraints lie in how some CV plans were designed, and 
how groups utilize the system. If no more than two seats are contested via CV in 
an election, it will be difficult for any minority to gain seats unless the minority 
votes as a block, controls a relatively large share of voting age population (near 
or greater than 33%), and mobilizes voters to turn out at rates matching or ex- 
ceeding the majority group's voters. 
If, however, the election plan creates a threshold that does not exceed the mi- 
nority group's electoral strength, and a minority political group is organized such 
that it can recruit candidates, perhaps have some control over nominations, 
and/or mobilize voters to direct all their votes to specific candidate(s), then many 
of the strategic burdens associated with CV/LV can be overcome. Our results 
suggest that these burdens are clearly surmountable, and that CV/LV plans do fa- 
cilitate proportionate descriptive representation of minority groups under easily 
obtainable conditions while avoiding the use of race-conscious districting. Our 
results suggest that many of the potential strategic burdens and coordination re- 
quirements associated with CV are readily overcome by minority candidates. 
Manuscript submitted 20 January 1997 
Final manuscript received 24 November 1997 
References 
Amy, Douglas. 1993. Real Chloices, New Voices. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi. 1988. "Minority Voting Equal- 
ity: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice." Law and Policy 10(1): 43-62. 
Brischetto, Robert. 1995. "The Rise of Cumulative Voting." Texas Obse-vei; 28 July, 6. 
Brischetto, Robert, and Richard Engstrom. 1998. "Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation: 
Exit Surveys in Fifteen Texas Communities." Social Science Quarter-ly. Forthcoming. 
Bullock, Charles S. 1994. "Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Districting Formats, and the Election 
of African-Americans." Journal of Politics 56:1098-1105. 
17 1995 is the only year that turnout data by ethnic group are available for Texas places using CV 
Latino candidates sought office in 15 Texas CV elections that year, and registration data were re- 
ported for 14 of these places. We are thus unable to prepare similar estimates using all 96 cases. 
These data are available in Brischetto and Engstrom 1998. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1124 David Brockington, Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and Robert Brischetto 
Bullock, Charles S. and Susan MacManus. 1993. "Testing the Assumptions of the Totality of Cir- 
cumstances Test." American Politics Quarterly 21:290-306. 
Christensen, Raymond, and Paul Johnson. 1995. "Toward a Context-Rich Analysis of Electoral Sys- 
tems." American Journal of Political Science 39:575-98. 
Cole, Richard, and Delbert Taebel. 1992. "Cumulative Voting in Local Elections: Lessons from the 
Alamagordo Experience." Social Science Quar-terly 73:194-201. 
Cole, Richard, Delbert Taebel and Richard Engstrom. 1990 "Cumulative Voting in a Municipal Elec- 
tion: A Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences." Western Political Quarterly 43(4): 
191-99. 
Cox, Gary. 1991. "SNTV and d'Hondt are 'Equivalent."' Electoral Studies 10(2): 118-32. 
Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Cotunt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cox, Gary, and Emerson Niou. 1994. "Seats Bonuses under Single Non Transferable Vote Systems." 
Comparative Political Studies 26(2): 221-36. 
Engstrom, Richard. 1993. "The Single-Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote 
Dilution." Univerity of San Francisco Law Review 27(4): 781-813. 
Engstrom, Richard, and Michael McDonald. 1981. "The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clari- 
fying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements on the Seats-population Relationship. American 
Political Science Review 75(2): 344-54. 
Goldburg, Carol. 1994. "The Accuracy of Game Theory Predictions for Political Behavior: Cumula- 
tive Voting in Illinois Revisited." Journal of Politics 56(4): 885-900. 
Guinier, Lani. 1991. "No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality." Virginia Law Review 
77:1414-1514. 
Guinier, Lani. 1994. Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy. 
New York: Free Press. 
Johnson, Richard. 1979. Political, Electoral, and Spatial Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Keech, William, and Michael Sistrom. 1994. "North Carolina." In Quiet Revolution in the South: 
The Ihpact of the Voting Rights Act, ed. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lakeman, Enid. 1970. How Democr-acies Vote. London: Faber and Faber. 
Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Massey, Douglas, and Nancy Denton. 1987. "Trends in Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispan- 
ics, and Asians: 1970-80." American Sociological Review 52(6): 802-25. 
Pildes, Richard, and Kristen Donoghue. 1995. "Cumulative Voting in the United States." Univer-sity 
of Chicago Legal Forum, 241-312. 
Polinard, Jerry, Robert Wrinkle, and Tomas Longoria. 1991. "The Impact of District Elections on the 
Mexican American Community: The Electoral Perspective." Social Science Quarterly 72(3): 
608-14. 
Sass, Tim R., and Stephen Mehay. N.d. "Minority Representation, Election Method, and Policy In- 
fluence." Department of Economics, Florida State University. Unpublished manuscript. 
Silva, Ruth. 1964. "Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats Appor- 
tioned to a Legislative District." Wester-n Political Quarterly 17(3): 742-69. 
Still, Edward. 1984. "Alternatives to Single-Member Districts." In Minority Vote Dilution, ed. 
Chandler Davidson. Washington, DC: Howard University Press. 
Still, Edward. 1991. "Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority 
Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections." Yale Law and Policy Review 9(2): 354-69. 
Swain, Carol. 1993. Black Faces, Black Inter-ests: The Representation of African-Americans in Con- 
gr-ess. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Taebel, Delbert. 1978. "Minority Representation on City Councils: The Impact of Structure on 
Blacks and Hispanics." Social Science Quiar-terly 59(1): 142-52. 
Thomas, James, and William Stewart. 1988. Alabamna Goverslnmenzt and Politics. Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting 1125 
Vedlitz, Arnold, and Charles Johnson. 1982. "Community Segregation, Electoral Structure, and 
Minority Representation." Social Science Quarterly 63(4): 729-36. 
Welch, Susan. 1990. "The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and 
Hispanics." Journal of Politics 52(4): 1050-76. 
David Brockington is Ph.D candidate in the Department of Political Science, 
University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195. 
Todd Donovan is associate professor of political science, Western Washington 
University, Bellingham, WA 98225. 
Shaun Bowler is associate professor of political science, University of 
California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92502. 
Robert Brischetto is adjunct professor of sociology, University of Texas at San 
Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78285. 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:13:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
